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Abstract
We consider cyclic Lotka-Volterra models with three and four strategies where at every inter-
action agents play a strategy using a time-dependent probability distribution. Agents learn from
a loss by reducing the probability to play a losing strategy at the next interaction. For that, an
agent is described as an urn containing β balls of three respectively four types where after a loss
one of the balls corresponding to the losing strategy is replaced by a ball representing the winning
strategy. Using both mean-field rate equations and numerical simulations, we investigate a range of
quantities that allow us to characterize the properties of these cyclic models with time-dependent
probability distributions. For the three-strategy case in a spatial setting we observe a transition
from neutrally stable to stable when changing the level of discretization of the probability distri-
bution. For large values of β, yielding a good approximation to a continuous distribution, spatially
synchronized temporal oscillations dominate the system. For the four-strategy game the system is
always neutrally stable, but different regimes emerge, depending on the size of the system and the
level of discretization.
PACS numbers: 05.70.Ln,05.50.+q,64.60.De,89.75.Kd
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I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory is nowadays a well established approach to model and study
complex biological and ecological systems [1–4]. Of special importance are thereby spatial
systems, as they give rise to novel and rich phenomena, ranging from the formation of com-
plicated space-time patterns, in the form of spirals or cluster coarsening, to the emergence
of nested ecological niches [5–8]. Most studies published in this context focused on spatial
cyclic games with three [9–32] or four species [33–38], but there have also been some attempts
to generalize this to more complex networks with a larger number of species [7, 35, 39–57].
In general, these competition models assume that an agent will play a single strategy when
confronted by another agent. The act of playing a single strategy is known in classical game
theory as a pure strategy [58]. In the literature on population and evolutionary dynamics a
strategy is associated with a single species and/or genotype. Depending upon the model dy-
namics a losing agent will either be removed completely or it will replace the losing strategy
with the winning pure strategy.
In game theory, other than pure strategies, there is also the notion of mixed strategies
[58]. A mixed strategy is when at every interaction an agent picks and plays one of the
possible pure strategies using a probability distribution. Mixed strategies are sometimes
encountered in nature [59, 60], but can be seen most readily in social systems where decision
making is important [61, 62]. Economics is another area where game theory with either pure
or mixed strategies has been studied. A series of economics papers focus on modifications
of the three-species rock-paper-scissors model (see, for example, [63–67]), whereas others tie
three-strategy cyclic domination to the Public Goods game [68–73]. Some papers discuss
spatial games in an economics setting, but usually only games with two pure strategies
(Prisoner’s Dilemma, Snowdrift, Hawk and Dove) are considered [74–77].
In this paper we study versions of the cyclic three- and four-strategy games where agents
are selecting a strategy from a time-dependent probability distribution. Learning from a
recent loss, an agent changes their probability distribution in such a way that it becomes
less likely to play the losing strategy at the next interaction. As the emerging space-time
properties in a spatial setting are of special interest, we focus in this work on agents that
live on a one-dimensional lattice and only interact with their two nearest neighbors. Some
results are also presented for the well-mixed situation without an underlying spatial system.
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In our implementation we describe every agent as an urn that contains β balls of three
respectively four different types, corresponding to the different pure strategies. At every
interaction one of these β balls is chosen randomly and the related strategy is played. If
that strategy loses, the ball is replaced by a different ball representing the winning strategy.
In that way the losing agent is less likely to play at the next interaction the losing strategy
again. It should be noted that the value of β is a measure of discretization of the probability
distribution, with the limit β −→ ∞ yielding a continuous distribution. As we discuss in
the following, changing the value of β has a strong impact on the properties of systems with
cyclic domination. For example, for the three-species strategies we observe a transition from
a neutrally stable system to a stable system when increasing β. In addition, in the limit of
β  1 the system synchronizes, yielding spatially extended coherent temporal waves. When
considering four strategies, one always has a neutrally stable system, but the average time
for strategy extinction displays different regimes, depending on the value of β and on the
system size.
Our paper is organized in the following way. In the next section we present our models
in more detail. Sections III and IV are devoted to our results, first for the three-strategy
case and then for the four-strategy model. In order to elucidate the properties of our
mixed-strategy spatial systems with cyclic domination and a time-dependent probability
distribution we study a range of quantities: time-dependent densities, space-time covariances
and related length scales, and average times for strategy extinction. We summarize and
conclude in Section V.
II. MODELS
In the symmetric Lotka-Volterra model reactions are taking place with rate λ in a cyclic
way between M different species [78, 79]:
Xi +Xi+1
λ→ Xi +Xi (1)
where Xi is an agent of species i, with i = 1, · · · ,M and the cyclic identification M + 1 ≡ 1.
In the language of population dynamics, every species has one prey and is the prey of a
single other species. The three-species case is special, as a reaction takes place whenever
two agents of different types are selected. For cases with more than three species one has
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mutually neutral species that do not interact [79, 80]. Cyclic Lotka-Volterra games can be
played in the well-mixed case as well as on lattices where a variety of situations have been
considered. For example, one can impose a strict site restriction with exactly one agent
occupying each lattice site and reactions taking place between neighboring sites [78, 79].
This can be coupled with exchanges of agents sitting on nearest neighbor sites, in order to
provide a mechanism for mobility [9, 12]. Sometimes the site restriction is dropped so that
every site can hold a variable number of agents that can diffuse and interact with agents on
neighboring sites [16]. In the related systems with May-Leonard dynamics, the reaction (1)
is replaced by two separate reactions [9, 81] (usually with different rates)
Xi +Xi+1 → Xi + 0
Xi + 0→ Xi +Xi
(2)
where 0 indicates an empty site. In this scheme the number of agents in the system is a
stochastic quantity that is only conserved on average.
We consider in the following versions of the three- and four-strategy cyclic Lotka-Volterra
game with mixed strategies where at every interaction agents play one of the possible strate-
gies using a time-dependent probability distribution. Imagine an agent as an urn that con-
tains β balls of three (for the three-strategy version) or four (for the four-strategy case)
different types. For a well-mixed system without a lattice structure we first choose two
agents/urns at random out of a total of N agents/urns before choosing randomly a ball out
of each selected urn. Depending on the types of balls selected, a reaction may take place
with rate λ = 1 following the scheme (1). If the strategy played by one of the agents is
beaten, then the losing ball is replaced by a ball of the winning type before the balls are
put back into the urns. The losing agent therefore changes the probability distribution as
a result of the loss by increasing (decreasing) the probability to play the winning (losing)
strategy at the next interaction. For a spatial game we only consider the case with exactly
one agent at every lattice site. In order to start an interaction we select an agent and one of
their neighbors at random and then proceed as for the well-mixed case. In our simulations
we define one time step to be Nβ proposed updates.
One can view this scheme in a spatial setting as a version of the spatial cyclic Lotka-
Volterra model with multiple occupancy of each site, but there are important differences. In
the model discussed in [16] in the context of population dynamics, individuals not only inter-
4
act with agents on other lattice sites, they also diffuse by jumping with a given probability
to one of the neighboring sites. As a result the number of individuals at each site fluctuates
and only the average spatial density is constant. In our case, only interactions take place
so that the number of balls at each site (which corresponds to the number of individuals at
a given site in the model of [16]) is strictly conserved. As we will see in the following, this
additional conservation law has a huge impact on the properties of our system.
III. THE MIXING OF THREE STRATEGIES
As already mentioned, the situation with three strategies is rather special, as every time
two different strategies are played, there will be a losing and a winning strategy. In the
following we show, both in the well-mixed case as well as on the ring, that for continuous
probability distributions a synchronization of the strategies played by the different agents
takes place. For small number of balls per agent a transition in the stability properties of
the lattice system is observed.
A. Mean-field equations for the well-mixed case
We first consider the mixed three-strategies game in a well-mixed system without spatial
structure. Agent j is characterized by the number of balls of each type at their possession:
(aj, bj, cj), with aj + bj + cj = β, where aj is the number of balls of type A. The state of the
system of N agents is then given by the number of balls of each type in possession of each
agent, i.e. by the configuration
{(an, bn, cn)} = {(a1, b1, c1), · · · , (aj, bj, cj), · · · , (aN , bN , cN)} . (3)
The interaction scheme (1) rates λ = 1 directly translates into the following Master
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equation for the probability that the system is in state {(an, bn, cn)} at time τ + 1.
P ({(an, bn, cn)} ; τ + 1) =
1
β2
2
N(N − 1)
[
+
∑
j
∑
i 6=j
ai(bj + 1)P (· · · , (ai, bi, ci), · · · , (aj − 1, bj + 1, cj), · · · ; τ)
+
∑
j
∑
i 6=j
bi(cj + 1)P (· · · , (ai, bi, ci), · · · , (aj, bj − 1, cj + 1), · · · ; τ)
+
∑
j
∑
i 6=j
ci(aj + 1)P (· · · , (ai, bi, ci), · · · , (aj + 1, bj, cj − 1), · · · ; τ)
]
+[1− 1
β2
2
N(N − 1)
∑
j
∑
i 6=j
(aibj + bicj + ciaj)]P ({(an, bn, cn)} ; τ)
(4)
where the factor 2
N(N−1) takes into account the number of combined choices of the two agents
i and j. The first three sums represent the reactions (1) through which the system enters
the state {(an, bn, cn)}, while the last term represents the case where no reaction happens
(when balls of the same type are pulled out for both agents) and the system stays in the
same state.
We define the density of ball type A for agent j at time τ to be
Aj(τ) =
∑
{(an,bn,cn)}
aj
β
P ({(an, bn, cn)} ; τ) (5)
with similar equations for ball types B and C. Neglecting correlations, Eqs. (4) and (5)
yield the equation (with similar equations found for the other ball types through symmetry)
Ak(τ + 1)− Ak(τ) =
∑
{(an,bn,cn)}
ak
β
(P ({(an, bn, cn)} ; τ + 1)− P ({(an, bn, cn)} ; τ))
=
∑
{(an,bn,cn)}
1
β3
2
N(N − 1)
∑
i 6=k
(aibk − ciak)P ({(an, bn, cn)} ; τ)
=
1
Nβ
[
2
(
1
N − 1
∑
i 6=k
Ai(τ)
)
Bk(τ)− 2
(
1
N − 1
∑
i 6=k
Ci(τ)
)
Ak(τ)
]
(6)
Letting t = τ
Nβ
and taking the continuum limit β → ∞ so that Ak(τ + 1) − Ak(τ) →
6
1
Nβ
∂tAk(t) finally leads to the mean-field equations
∂tAk(t) = 2
(
1
N − 1
∑
i 6=k
Ai(t)
)
Bk(t)− 2
(
1
N − 1
∑
i 6=k
Ci(t)
)
Ak(t)
∂tBk(t) = 2
(
1
N − 1
∑
i 6=k
Bi(t)
)
Ck(t)− 2
(
1
N − 1
∑
i 6=k
Ai(t)
)
Bk(t)
∂tCk(t) = 2
(
1
N − 1
∑
i 6=k
Ci(t)
)
Ak(t)− 2
(
1
N − 1
∑
i 6=k
Bi(t)
)
Ck(t)
(7)
As we show in Appendix A, the usual mean-field rate equations for the well-mixed rock-
paper-scissors model are recovered if one takes in addition the limit of infinitely many agents,
N −→∞.
Let us have a closer look at the simple case of two agents N = 2. Eqs. (7) can be easily
written as
∂tA1 = 2(A2B1 − C2A1) , ∂tA2 = 2(A1B2 − C1A2)
∂tB1 = 2(B2C1 − A2B1) , ∂tB2 = 2(B1C2 − A1B2)
∂tC1 = 2(C2A1 −B2C1) , ∂tC2 = 2(C1A2 −B1C2)
(8)
From ∂t(A1 − A2) we find
∂t(A1 − A2) = 2 [(A2B1 − C2A1)− (A1B2 − C1A2)] = −2(A1 − A2) (9)
as Ai +Bi + Ci = 1. Solving this differential equation yields
A1(t)− A2(t) = (a1 − a2)e−2t (10)
where a1 = A1(0) and a2 = A2(0) are initial conditions. Similar equations are obtained for
ball types B and C. It follows that whatever the initial conditions the difference in ball
densities of the two agents vanish exponentially fast, yielding a synchronization of the two
agents. Although not presented here, the synchronization of more than two agents has also
been studied in some detail, see [82].
We can use the previous results to eliminate the densities of agent 2 and end up with the
following three coupled non-autonomous differential equations for the ball densities of agent
1:
∂tA1 = 2(A1B1 − C1A1) + 2 [(a2 − a1)B1 − (c2 − c1)A1] e−2t
∂tB1 = 2(B1C1 − A1B1) + 2 [(b2 − b1)C1 − (a2 − a1)B1] e−2t
∂tC1 = 2(C1A1 −B1C1) + 2 [(c2 − c1)A1 − (b2 − b1)C1] e−2t
(11)
7
We note that in the long time limit t→∞ we recover the mean field rate equations for the
well-mixed rock-paper-scissors game.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Time-dependent densities for a system of two agents obtained through
numerical integration of Eqs. (11) (full black line: agent 1, green dashed line: agent 2) and
compared with results from stochastic simulations with β = 107 (red circles: agent 1, blue squares:
agent 2). The same initial conditions A1(0) = 0.8, B1(0) = 0.1, A2(0) = 0.1, and B2(0) = 0.8
are used for both methods. In (d) the symbols represent the absolute values of the difference
between strategy densities in the simulation data, while the lines are obtained from Eqs. (11). An
exponentially fast synchronization is observed. The dot-dashed blue line indicates an exponential
of slope −2.
In Fig. 1 we compare these theoretical results (lines in the figure), obtained through
numerical integration of the Eqs. (11), with results from stochastic simulations (symbols in
the figure) for initial conditions A1(0) = 0.8, B1(0) = 0.1, A2(0) = 0.1, and B2(0) = 0.8.
We find that the numerical integration results agree with the stochastic simulation very
well; in analogy with the three-species well-mixed model [83] we expect the fluctuations
for an individual agent to be proportional to β−1/2. Even though the initial conditions are
very different, the synchronization between the two agents is very rapid and the differences
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between the corresponding densities vanish exponentially, see Fig. 1d.
B. Numerical simulations on the ring
The simplest spatial system is the one-dimensional lattice with periodic boundary con-
ditions. As discussed previously, every site of the ring is occupied by one agent who has at
their disposal β balls. In the initial state every ball is assigned with the same probability
one of three possible types corresponding to the three strategies A, B, and C. Once the
system has been prepared in that way, pairs of neighboring sites are randomly selected and
interactions take place following the scheme described above.
The dynamics can be readily visualized through space-time plots as those shown in Fig.
2. Inspection of these plots for various numbers of balls β reveals an interesting transition
in the shape of the space-time patterns. Whereas for three balls or less the system behaves
like the standard Lotka-Volterra rock-paper-scissors game on the ring with immobile agents
(which corresponds to β = 1) and exhibits coarsening processes that end when only one
strategy fills the complete lattice (see Fig. 2a), for β ≥ 4 a tiling structure appears where a
tile indicates that a part of the system is dominated by one of the three strategies for a finite
amount of time, see Fig. 2b. It follows that every agent changes the most likely strategy
after some time and that it becomes difficult for one strategy to dominate the system. This
tiling structure is reminiscent of very similar patterns that are encountered when allowing
in the one-dimensional rock-paper-scissors model for swapping of particles as an efficient
mechanism for mobility [13]. As discussed further below, see Fig. 3, the tiling structure
promotes coexistence and stabilizes the system, with only rare large stochastic fluctuations
causing the finite system to go to an absorbing fixed point. When we further increase β,
the tiles, corresponding to regions where one strategy dominates locally, decrease in size, see
Fig. 2c for the case with β = 6. This is accompanied by the emergence of grayish patches
that indicate spatial regions where in the probability distribution the three strategies have
similar weights. Finally for large values of β, corresponding to a probability distribution
that approximates a continuous distribution, the system rapidly synchronizes and spatial
extended coherent temporal waves are formed, as shown in Fig. 2d for the example of
β = 100 balls.
In order to relate the coarsening and tiling space-time patterns to different extinction
9
(a) (b)
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Space-time plots for three-strategies games on a ring with different numbers
of balls β on each site: (a) β = 3, (b) β = 4, (c) β = 6, and (d) β = 100. Time progresses from top
to bottom. For (a)-(c) 1000 time steps are shown for a system composed of 1000 sites, whereas for
(d) we show 500 time steps for a system with 500 lattice points. To determine the color of a lattice
site we use the RGB color model and map the percentage of A, B, and C to the percentage of the
colors Red, Green and Blue respectively. In this scheme a site that contains the same number of
balls for all three species is assigned a grayish color.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Average lattice domination time T as a function of the total number of
balls Nβ in the system. When changing the number of balls β per agent, a transition takes place
between an algebraic dependence on the total number of balls in the system for β ≤ 3, see panel
(a), indicating a neutrally stable system, and an exponential dependence for β ≥ 4, characterizing a
stable system, see panel (b). Each data point results from an average over 2000 runs with different
realizations of the noise. Error bars are smaller than the symbol sizes.
regimes, we measure the average lattice domination time T , i.e. the average time at which
only one of the strategies remains in the system. Fig. 3 reveals that the average lattice
domination time changes its dependence on the system size at the transition gleaned from
the space-time plots. For β ≤ 3 the average lattice domination time increases algebraically
with the total number of balls, T ∼ (Nβ)b, as shown by the straight lines in the log-log plot
in panel (a) of Fig. 3, with the exponent b = 1.93(2), 1.90(2), and 1.77(2) for β = 1, 2,
and 3, respectively. As shown in Ref. [9, 84, 85], there is a direct correspondence between
the system size dependence (exponential, algebraic, or logarithmic) of the lattice domination
time of a system and its stability properties (stable coexistence, neutrally stable coexistence,
or unstable coexistence). The observed algebraic dependence therefore indicates that the
system is neutrally stable. We also note that the lattice domination time for a fixed value of
Nβ decreases for increasing β, indicating that the system becomes less stable. This trend
is reversed when we enter the tiling regime, see Fig. 3b, as now for fixed Nβ the lattice
domination time strongly increases with β. In fact, the dependence of T on Nβ changes to
an exponential dependence for β ≥ 4, as the system becomes a stable system [83].
Another quantity that allows us to gain insights into this transition is the total space-time
11
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Spatial covariance at time t = 1000 for different numbers of balls β
(increasing from 1 to 6 from (a) to (f)) and different system sizes. The data result from averaging
over half a million independent runs.
covariance
C0(x, t) =
CAA(x, t) + CBB(x, t) + CCC(x, t)
3
(12)
with
CAA(x, t) =
1
N
∑
i
Ai(t)Ai+x(t)− µA(t)µA(t) (13)
and similar expressions for CBB(x, t) and CCC(x, t). Here µA(t) =
1
N
∑
iAi(t) and similarly
for µB and µC . Fig. 4 shows this quantity after 1000 time steps since the preparation of the
system for β ranging from 1 to 6 and system sizes between N = 500 and N = 10000. For
β ≤ 3 the covariance displays the expected behavior for systems with domain ordering, with
strong finite size effects for small systems, as in many instances runs have already reached
their final state (with one strategy filling the whole system) at t = 1000, and an exponential
decay with the distance x for larger sizes when the coarsening system is still far from its
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final state. After the transition to the tiling regime, see (d) to (f) in Fig. 4, the initial decay
becomes system size independent and is followed by a shoulder (see the data for β = 6 in
Fig. 4f). We relate this behavior to the typical sizes of the tiles whose spatial extensions
are rather small and decrease with an increase of β.
C. Spatial mean-field equations and synchronization
As we saw in Fig. 2d synchronization in space coupled with temporal oscillations sets in
for large number of balls β. As in the limit β −→ ∞ the probability distribution becomes
continuous, we can capture this effect through spatial mean-field equations.
Our starting point are the mean-field equations (7) for N agents in the well-mixed case
with β −→ ∞ that need to be adapted to the spatial setting of a one-dimensional lattice
where the agent on lattice site k interacts exclusively with the agents located on the neigh-
boring sites k− 1 and k + 1. Each sum in (7) over i 6= k then reduces to two terms, so that
we obtain for Ak(t) (with similar equations for Bk(t) and Ck(t)):
∂tAk = (Ak+1 + Ak−1)Bk − (Ck+1 + Ck−1)Ak . (14)
Introducing the finite difference ∆2Ak = (Ak+1 − Ak) − (Ak − Ak−1) allows to recast this
equation in the form
∂tAk = (∆
2Ak)Bk − (∆2Ck)Ak + 2(BkAk − CkAk) . (15)
Taking the spatial continuum limit, where we approximate ∆ by a∂x, yields the following
set of partial differential equations
∂tA(x, t) =
(
∂2xA(x, t)
)
B(x, t)− (∂2xC(x, t))A(x, t) + 2 (B(x, t)A(x, t)− C(x, t)A(x, t))
∂tB(x, t) =
(
∂2xB(x, t)
)
C(x, t)− (∂2xA(x, t))B(x, t) + 2 (C(x, t)B(x, t)− A(x, t)B(x, t))
∂tC(x, t) =
(
∂2xC(x, t)
)
A(x, t)− (∂2xB(x, t))C(x, t) + 2 (A(x, t)C(x, t)−B(x, t)C(x, t))
(16)
where we set the length scale a = 1. This set of equations can straightforwardly be general-
ized to d dimensions. The terms ∂2x describe the diffusion of strategies through interactions,
as the loser of an interaction changes their probability distribution in favor of the strategy
against which they lost. The remaining terms are nothing else than the mean-field equations
of the normal three-species cyclic game in the well-mixed case.
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(a) (b)
FIG. 5: (Color online) Space-time plots from (a) numerical integration of the spatial mean-field
equations (16) and (b) the numerical simulation of a system of 100 lattice sites over 100 time steps
with β = 106 balls at each site. In both cases the same initial condition (17) was used. Time
increases in the downward direction. The system rapidly synchronizes and coherent waves are
formed.
In Fig. 5a we show the numerical solutions of this set of equations for the initial condition
A(x, t = 0) =
1
2
Θ[N/5− |x−N/2|]
B(x, t = 0) =
1
2
Θ[N/4− |x−N/2|]
C(x, t = 0) = 1− A(x, t = 0)−B(x, t = 0)
(17)
where Θ[· · · ] is the Heaviside step function. In this initial state large segments of the
system are occupied by agents that play the same initial strategy. For comparison we show
in Fig. 5b a numerical simulation for β = 106 balls and the same initial condition. As
expected a system with such a large number of balls is well described by the mean-field
equations. The space-time plots in Fig. 5 show that the spatial system with a continuous
probability distribution synchronizes very rapidly, yielding spatially extended regions where
the probability distribution of every agent is very similar. As a result the strategies in the
whole system coherently oscillate in time. This synchronization effect, which is independent
of the initial condition, is readily understood from Eqs. (16) by remarking that the diffusion
terms efficiently smooth out the spatial inhomogeneities in the probability distributions until
only the well-mixed terms describing the standard rock-paper-scissors interactions matter.
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IV. THE MIXING OF FOUR STRATEGIES
It results from the reactions (1) that in the cyclic Lotka-Volterra scheme with four strate-
gies, pairs of mutually neutral strategies are encountered, as the strategies A and C (B
and D) do not compete against each other [80]. In the case of pure strategies, this part-
nership formation yields in a spatial game the formation of domains composed of neutral
partners [33] as an agent with a given strategy takes advantage of the fact that its neutral
partner plays a strategy that beats the strategy against which the agent would lose. This
guiding principle also holds true when considering a four-strategies mixed game with time-
dependent probability distributions. Still, remarkable changes in the domain structure and
in the mean lattice domination time take place when changing the level of discretization of
the probability distribution by increasing β.
A first impression of the changes that happen when the number of balls β is increased
can be gained from the space-time plots shown in Fig. 6. For β = 1 we see the formation
of regions dominated by neutral pairs (red and blue vs green and black). As there is no
mechanism for mobility, red and blue (green and black) single-species regions become stuck
within one another, forming superdomains of neutral partners [78, 79]. As a result a winning
strategy can invade the region of a losing strategy only until it hits a patch occupied by the
partner strategy of the losing strategy. This results in the zig-zag like structures where the
different strategies (in the order red, black, blue, green) dominate one after the other over
a region of the lattice. These regions grow in extent after each change of strategy, yielding
ultimately a lattice occupied by only one of the partnerships (either red and blue or green
and black). As we increase β, domains of neutral pairs become effectively mixed, and a third
strategy has a higher probability to invade a superdomain occupied by a given alliance. This
results in a much slower growth of the neutral pair domains. Further increasing β causes
the neutral species pairs to become very well mixed, resulting in two types of neutral-species
domains that overall look purple and dark green. These neutral-species domains continue
to compete against each other, yielding a slow coarsening process. Within these coarsening
domains cyclic processes continue unabated, as revealed by the appearance of localized wave
patterns for very large β, see Fig. 6d. These waves are very much like those encountered in
the three-species case, albeit of smaller extent, only that now one cycles through four types
of balls instead of three.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Space-time plots for four-strategies games on a ring with different numbers
of balls β on each site: (a) β = 1, (b) β = 10, (c) β = 20, and (d) β = 50. Time progresses from
top to bottom. 1000 time steps are shown for systems composed of 1000 sites. To determine the
color of a lattice site we use the RGB color model and map the percentage of A, B, and C to the
percentage of the colors Red, Green and Blue respectively. This is adequate as the percentage of
D is readily obtained from the fact that the sum over all four densities is 1.
For a more quantitative discussion we turn again to the space-time covariance of the form
CXY (x, t) =
1
N
∑
i
Xi(t)Yi+x(t)− µX(t)µY (t) (18)
which yields the self-covariance if the species X and Y are the same (see Eq. (13)) and
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the cross-covariance otherwise. We then define an individual spatial covariance through the
equation
Ci(x, t) =
1
4
(CAA(x, t) + CBB(x, t) + CCC(x, t) + CDD(x, t)) . (19)
A different spatial covariance can be obtained when we do not distinguish anymore between
neutral strategies but consider them to form a unique group, i.e. strategies A and C together
form the group denoted byA, whereas B and D make up the group B. We call the space-time
covariance for these larger groups
Cn(x, t) =
1
2
(CAA(x, t) + CBB(x, t)) (20)
the neutral spatial covariance. From these two quantities we can extract two different time-
dependent length scales, Li(t) and Ln(t), that provide some insights into the ordering of the
superdomains formed by neutral partners. These lengths are obtained from the intersection
of the normalized covariance, Ci(x, t)/Ci(0, t) and Cn(x, t)/Cn(0, t), with a line of a constant
value k, i.e. Ci(Li(t), t)/Ci(0, t) = k and similarly for Ln(t). We use in the following k = 0.5
after carefully checking that the qualitative features discussed below do not depend on the
precise value of k.
Fig. 7 shows the time evolution of these two lengths for different values of β. Let us
first look at the pure case with β = 1, as we can compare for this case our lengths with
those discussed previously in the literature. As shown by Frachebourg et al [79] one needs
to consider two different types of domains for the four-species Lotka-Volterra model with
immobile particles on a one-dimensional chain: the pure domains occupied by a single species
and the superdomains shared by two non-interacting species. Starting from a fully disordered
state, the pure domains increase as t1/3, whereas the superdomain size, i.e. the distance
between active interfaces, is proportional to t2/3. As seen in panel (a), for the case β = 1
both lengths Li(t) and Ln(t) provide essentially the same information on the superdomains:
they are proportional and both display an algebraic increase with an exponent 2/3 before
saturating due to finite-size effects.
Increasing β yields a slowing down of the coarsening process as manifested by a gradual
decrease of the exponent governing the growth of the two lengths. For β = 5, for example,
the effective exponent before the transition to the saturation regime is close to 0.45, see
panel (b). This decrease of the exponent describing the long-time regime before saturation
continues when further increasing β, with a value of 0.14 for β = 15 and 0.05 for β = 30,
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Time-dependent lengths extracted from the space-time covariance for the
four-strategies mixed model on a one-dimensional lattice. The different panels show results for
different values of β: (a) β = 1, (b) β = 5, (c) β = 15, (d) β = 30. Li respectively Ln is obtained
from the individual respectively neutral spatial covariance. In (a) the system size is N = 5000,
whereas in all other panels data for a system of 2500 sites are shown. The data result from averaging
over typically a few thousand independent runs. In (a) the dashed line indicates an exponent of
2/3, whereas in (c) and (d) the short red lines indicate an algebraic growth with an exponent of
1/2.
see panels (c) and (d). This very slow increase for large β is not size-dependent and should
therefore not be confused with the finite-size plateau seen for example in (a) for β = 1.
The very weak increase of the correlation length for large β and large t instead indicates
that domain growth almost comes to a standstill due to strong mixing effects. Interestingly,
for large β this long-term regime is preceded by another regime where Ln increases as a
square-root of time (indicated by the red segments in (c) and (d)), whereas Li displays
some non-trivial features that reflect the complicated ordering processes seen in the space-
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time plots. We tentatively identify this regime with the initial formation and growth of the
neutral-species superdomains followed by a coarsening process where essentially only two
types of domains compete against each other.
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FIG. 8: (Color online) Average lattice domination time as a function of the total number of balls
Nβ in the system. Each data point results from an average over 2000 runs, the standard error
being smaller than the sizes of the symbols.
Another way to characterize these systems is through the study of lattice domination
events. The lattice domination time shown in Fig. 8 is the mean number of time steps
needed until only one neutral species pair remains in the system. Interestingly, different
regimes also show up in the lattice domination time when changing the value of β. For
β = 1, i.e. the case of pure strategies, the lattice domination time increases with the system
size as N1.40 [37], making this a neutrally stable system. Increasing β slightly changes the
exponent (for β = 4 its value is 1.68), but has no other effect on the lattice domination time.
For β ≥ 5, however, different regimes emerge as a function of the system size, as shown
in Fig. 8a. Plotting the lattice domination time against the total number of balls in the
system, Nβ, reveals a first regime where the lattice domination time increases algebraically
with an exponent close to 2. This is followed by a crossover to a second algebraic regime
with a much larger exponent (for example, for β = 30 the exponent is 5.60). For β not
too large, this crossover takes place at rather similar values of Nβ, i.e. the larger β is, the
smaller the needed system size is to enter the second algebraic regime. Fig. 8b displays
another change of behavior for values of β > 20, as the crossover is then shifted to larger
values of Nβ when increasing β. For the smaller sizes, i.e. before the crossover, the data for
different β values fall on one common curve with an exponent of approximately 1.5.
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The emergence of two regimes in the lattice domination time for β ≥ 5 can be related to
different types of extinction events linked to the prevailing domain structure. On the one
hand, in small systems extinction can take place at rather short times since the preparation
of the system, due to the formation of a few superdomains followed by a coarsening of
these domains. For larger N many such domains are formed, resulting in complicated
processes dominated by triangular (zig-zag) space-time patterns as those seen in Fig. 6b
for β = 10. This periodic cycling through triangles of all four ball types yields a very slow
coarsening process. A further increase of β results in the replacement in this second regime
of the triangular structures by very long-lived wave patterns, due to some spatially localized
synchronization, that dominate the purplish and dark green domains in Fig. 6d. Domains
grow very slowly in that regime, see the late-time behavior of the growth length shown in
Fig. 7d, and extinction events are only encountered at very late times.
In [37] we showed for the four-species model with pure strategies (β = 1) that much
can be learned about extinction events when studying the probability distribution of the
lattice domination time. We expect this to be also true for the more complicated cases with
β large. However, the extremely large values of the domination times make it impossible
with the resources at our disposal to perform enough runs for a reliable computation of this
probability distribution.
V. CONCLUSION
Systems composed of multiple species that interact in a cyclic way have been at the center
of a multitude of studies in recent years. Mostly discussed in the context of evolutionary
game theory and population dynamics, these systems allow to understand some of the generic
properties arising from non-trivial interactions in ecological systems.
In this paper we discussed a version of the three- and four-species Lotka-Volterra model
where the agents are using a mixed strategy, i.e. agents play a pure strategy using a proba-
bility distribution every time they interact. Taking into account that agents, both in ecology
and economics, tend to learn from past experience, we consider time-dependent probability
distributions where a losing agent decreases the probability to play a losing strategy at the
next interaction. In order to do so, we treat an agent as an urn containing β balls of three
respectively four types, where each type corresponds to one of the three respectively four
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strategies. If a strategy loses, a ball of the corresponding type is replaced by a ball with
the winning strategy. The number of balls β in the urn therefore measures the level of
discretization of the probability distribution, with the limit β −→ ∞ corresponding to a
continuous distribution.
As our study revealed, some remarkable changes take place when changing the level
of discretization. For the three-strategy case on a one-dimensional lattice we observe a
transition between neutrally stable for β ≤ 3, where the average time needed for one strategy
to completely pervade the system grows algebraically with the system size due to coarsening
of single domains, to stable for β > 3, where this time increases exponentially with the
extent of the system, thus indicating the existence of a stable attractor in the coexistence
region. This transition gives rise to a change of space-time patterns and the emergence of a
tiling structure where strategies dominate for a finite amount of time over certain regions of
the lattice. In the limit β  1, when the probability distribution approximates a continuous
distribution, this tiling structure evolves into spatially extended waves where the dominating
strategies changes periodically. Synchronization throughout the system is also encountered
in the case without spatial dependence and can be understood in the mean-field limit of
an infinite number of agents using continuous probability distributions by analyzing the
corresponding rate equations. Comparing our three strategy results to those found in [16]
for a related multi occupancy model, we find much richer dynamics and a transition in the
stability properties of fully occupied lattices when changing the occupancy parameter β.
The four-strategy case is characterized by the existence of pairs of non-interacting strate-
gies. As a result agents in a spatial setting with β = 1 want to ally themselves with agents
that play the complementary strategy in order to fight off the competing pair of strategies.
A direct consequence of this rivalry between competing alliances is the formation and coars-
ening of superdomains occupied by a single alliance. In contrast to the three-strategy case,
an increase of β does not yield a stable system. Instead, the mean lattice domination time,
i.e. the average time needed for one alliance to completely fill the system, always increases
algebraically with Nβ. Still, different regimes can be identified as a function of N and β.
For example for large values of these parameters a very slow coarsening process is observed,
with local synchronized waves within the competing domains.
Besides some results for the well-mixed case without spatial setting, we focus in this
paper on the one-dimensional lattice. It is well known from cases with β = 1 that the
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dimensionality of the lattice can have a huge impact on the properties of the system. Taking
into account the already complex behavior observed in our study of the ring, we expect the
appearance of additional intriguing features, especially for the four-strategy case, when
considering systems with time-dependent probability distributions in two space dimensions.
In our paper we only considered immobile agents. This is of course not a realistic descrip-
tion for ecological systems. For the Lotka-Volterra type models considered here, mobility
can be implemented through the swapping of agents occupying neighboring lattice sites.
It would be interesting to see how the different regimes are modified when allowing for
exchanges of agents. We expect to come back to that question in the future.
We have restricted us to the simple three- and four-species Lotka-Volterra models with
time-dependent probability distribution, as for these situations the properties for the case
β = 1 are well understood and provide a case against which we can study changes that
emerge when using a time-dependent probability distribution to play a strategy. Recently
there has been a strong focus on more complicated situations, with more species and/or
more complex interaction schemes. It is an interesting question how the properties of these
systems change when considering a mixed strategy game with a time-dependent probability
distribution. We expect this to be a very fruitful research avenue for the future.
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Appendix A: Mean-field equations for the three-species case and N −→∞
For the well-mixed case the first of the three equations in (7) can be rewritten as
∂tAk(t) = 2
(
1
N − 1
∑
i 6=k
Ai(t)
)
Bk(t)− 2
(
1
N − 1
∑
i 6=k
Ci(t)
)
Ak(t)
=
2
N − 1
(
Bk
N∑
i
Ai − Ak
N∑
i
Ci −BkAk + AkCk
)
=
2
N − 1 (BkN〈A〉N − AkN〈C〉N −BkAk + AkCk)
= 2
(
Bk
N
N − 1〈A〉N − Ak
N
N − 1〈C〉N +
AkCk −BkAk
N
)
(A1)
where 〈· · · 〉N denotes a mean over all agents/urns in the system. Taking N → ∞ and
making the index k to be continuous yields
∂tA(x, t) = 2B(x, t)〈A(x, t)〉x − 2A(x, t)〈C(x, t)〉x (A2)
where 〈· · · 〉x =
∫
(··· ) dx∫
dx
indicates an average over the continuous index x. Finally, applying
〈· · · 〉x on both sides of Eq. (A2) yields
∂t〈A(x, t)〉x = 2〈B(x, t)〉x〈A(x, t)〉x − 2〈A(x, t)〉x〈C(x, t)〉x
∂t〈B(x, t)〉x = 2〈C(x, t)〉x〈B(x, t)〉x − 2〈B(x, t)〉x〈A(x, t)〉x
∂t〈C(x, t)〉x = 2〈A(x, t)〉x〈C(x, t)〉x − 2〈C(x, t)〉x〈B(x, t)〉x
(A3)
where the second and third equations follow from symmetry. These are exactly the mean
field equations for the three-species well-mixed case.
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